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JUSTICE IN BLACK: WILLIAM HASTIE AND THURGOOD
MARSHALL’S FIGHT FOR AN EQUALITARIAN LEGAL
ORDER
IAN L. COURTS
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the first third of this [Twentieth] century, the effective institutionalization of racism was the common experience of most Negroes. Settled American law required and sanctioned such rigid and comprehensive
segregation and subordination of [B]lacks that, to most people, even talk
of any significant movement toward an equalitarian legal order seemed visionary, or even foolish. 1
Racism separates, but it never liberates. Hatred generates fear, and fear
once given a foothold; binds, consumes and imprisons. Nothing is gained
from prejudice. No one benefits from racism. “We must dissent.”2

Fueled by their belief in the “equality [of all men] under the law,” some
Black intellectuals challenged the racist practices of America’s legal structure though it seemed an insurmountable task in the early twentieth century.
Two of those persons were William Henry Hastie, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall. Hastie and Marshall entered the legal profession and fought for an
“equalitarian legal order,” as referenced in the epigraphs above. Many similarities exist between Hastie and Marshall such as both were attorneys and
later judges. They each also served as legal counsel for the National Association of Colored People (NAACP) and argued civil rights cases before the
United States Supreme Court.3 Notably, Hastie and Marshall made history
in their judicial appointments. In 1937, William H. Hastie became the first
Black American federal judge.4 Moreover, in 1967, Thurgood Marshall
became the first Black United States Supreme Court Justice.5
1. William H. Hastie, Toward an Equalitarian Legal Order, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 407, Blacks and the Law 18 (1973).
2. Thurgood Marshall, Supreme Justice: Speeches and Writings (2003)
3. William H. Hastie, Toward an Equalitarian Legal Order, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 407, Blacks and the Law 18 (1973).
4. Gilbert Ware, Grace Under Pressure, 86 (1984).
5. Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Supreme Court,
6 Harv. Blackletter J. 27 (1989)
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In my limited research on Hastie’s and Marshall’s contributions to African American communities, to American society, and to the legal profession, I found several articles that examined them individually; however, I
did not find a single article that compared Hastie’s and Marshall’s accomplishments. Thus, my discussion of these two legal titans primarily focuses
on their advocacy as attorneys and examines their jurisprudence as jurists.
Hastie’s and Marshall’s advocacy and jurisprudence affirms their belief in
the establishment of an “equalitarian legal order” that protects individual
rights.
I.
WHO ARE THEY?
William H. Hastie
William Henry Hastie, Jr. was born in Knoxville, Tennessee on November 17, 1904, to William Henry Hastie, Sr and Roberta Childs. 6 According
to Hastie, he was raised in Knoxville and his family moved to Washington,
D.C. when he was ten years old.7 Hastie excelled academically and enrolled
in Amherst College in Massachusetts.8 Hastie’s academic success continued
while at Amherst where he graduated valedictorian and was initiated into
Phi Beta Kappa honor society in 1925.9 Following his success at Amherst
College, Hastie enrolled in law school at Harvard University and graduated
with a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) in 1930,10 and later achieved a Doctor of
Judicial Science (SJD) also from Harvard.11 According to Hastie, he began
practicing law in the early 1930s in Washington D.C.12
Hastie’s first legal position within the government was as an assistant solicitor in the Department of Interior.13 During his tenure in the solicitor’s
office Hastie stated that “[among other legal issues], I was assigned problems of the Virgin Island, one of them being to work with some other lawyers on the matter of setting up a corporate structure for the purpose of rehabilitating the [island’s] sugar and rum industr[ies].”14 Hastie’s legal work
pertaining to the United States’ Virgin Islands was important because he
would subsequently be appointed to the federal district court of the Virgin

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Vile, John R. Great American lawyers: an encyclopedia. 1, (2001).
Truman Library, Oral Histories: William Hastie Transcript, 2 (1972).
Gilbert Ware supra at 6, 12
Id at 19.
Id at 30.
Id.
Truman Library, Oral Histories: William Hastie Transcript, 2 (1972).
Id.
Id at 3
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Islands in 1937.15 Hastie served on the Virgin Island federal district court
from 1937 until late 1939.16 After stepping down from the district court
bench, Hastie returned to Washington, D.C. and began serving as the Dean
of the historic Howard Law School. Hastie served as dean of Howard Law
School from 1939 until 1946. It was during Hastie’s tenure as Dean that his
relationship with Thurgood Marshall, another young Black attorney and
Howard Law alumnus, began. Hastie and Marshall would argue many of
the NAACP’s early civil rights cases together notably, Smith v. Allwright,17
and Morgan v. Virginia.18 Hastie would later serve as an assistant to the
U.S. Secretary of War and later Governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Hastie was an early advocate for civil rights and equality under the law.
One of Hastie’s first significant cases in the establishment of an equalitarian
legal order was Hocutt v. Wilson.19 Thomas R. Hocutt was a Black man
living in North Carolina who had aspirations to attend the University of
North Carolina’s School of Pharmacy.20 UNC School of Pharmacy’s policy
excluded Black Americans from admission. Thomas Hocutt applied for
admission to UNC School of Pharmacy and was denied.21 Moreover, Dr.
James E. Shepard, president of the North Carolina Colored College (now
North Carolina Central University) refused to approve the release of
Hocutt’s academic transcript because he desired that a department of law, a
department of pharmacy and a department of medicine be established at his
institution.22 Hastie argued before the Durham County Superior Court that
UNC’s refusal to admit Hocutt on the basis of race was an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.23 Although Hocutt was denied relief, Hastie’s advocacy in Hocutt laid the
framework for Thurgood Marshall’s victory in Brown v. Board of Education. 24
Thurgood Marshall
Thurgood Marshall was born in Baltimore, Maryland on July 2, 1908, to
William Canfield Marshall and Norma Arica. Marshall graduated high
school in 1925 and enrolled in Lincoln University in Oxford, Pennsylva15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757; 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944).
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S. Ct. 1050; 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).
Hocutt v. Wilson, N.C. Super. Ct. (1933).
Gilbert Ware supra 46.
Id at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id at 54.
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nia.25 Lincoln University is a historically Black university and was known
as the “Black Princeton.”26 Upon graduating in 1930, Marshall had married,
made life-long friends, expanded his social network and established a
strong academic record.27
After graduating from Lincoln University, Marshall applied to law school
at the University of Maryland.28 The University of Maryland’s law school
was one of the prominent law schools in Maryland and close to home for
Marshall. Marshall, unfortunately, was denied admission to the law school
because he was Black.29 After his rejection from the University of Maryland, Marshall enrolled in another historically Black university, Howard
law school.30 While at Howard, Marshall met Charles Hamilton Houston
who would later have a profound impact on his life and ideology concerning civil rights and the Constitution.31 Charles Hamilton Houston was an
established and well-respected attorney and legal scholar who impressed
upon Marshall the importance of professionalism and viewing the Constitution as a document that ensured the protection of individual rights.32 Mr.
Houston believed that the duty of a lawyer, especially a Black lawyer, was
to use his training to bring about positive and impactful change in society.33
Mr. Houston was quoted as saying: “a lawyer’s either a social engineer or
… a parasite on society.” This idea of legal activism was evidenced in Marshall’s life through his civil rights cases with the NAACP, his judicial philosophy as a federal appellate judge, and later his philosophy as an associate justice on the United States Supreme Court.
Marshall began his legal career by hanging out his own shingle in solopractice. Marshall’s skill as an advocate and his willingness to help any
client that came to him began to catch the attention of major organizations
such as the NAACP. Marshall joined the NAACP and began working in
their legal department with Charles Hamilton Houston and later William
Henry Hastie, Jr. Marshall later became the director and senior counsel of
the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund and through his work there he started his
25. Williams, Juan. “The Higher Education of Thurgood Marshall.” The Journal of Blacks in
Higher Education, no. 22 (1998): 82-88
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. “[Dedications: Thurgood Marshall 1908-1993].” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education,
no. 6 (1994): 2-3
29. Juan Williams supra at 86.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Hastie, William H. “Charles Hamilton Houston 1895-1950.” The Journal of Negro History 35,
no. 3 (1950): 355-58.
33. Tushnet, Mark. “The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause,
Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston.” The Journal of American History 74, no. 3 (1987): 884903.
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now-famous civil rights advocacy.34 Marshall’s crowning advocacy
achievement was the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education decision. Although the results were not readily apparent in 1954 when the Supreme
Court heralded the words “separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal,” no one could deny the monumentality of the court’s decision and
Marshall’s advocacy.35 Marshall’s experiences would pave a way for him to
serve on the federal bench with the power to interpret and administer the
law and precedent he advocated for.
II.
WORKING TOGETHER: EARLY CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
In the 1940s, Hastie and Marshall began arguing civil rights cases together for the NAACP. This section will examine two significant cases,
Smith v. Allwright and Morgan v. Virginia, which were among the
NAACP’s earliest cases and were argued by Hastie and Thurgood together.
These early lawsuits “arouse[d] public interest and support as well as . . .
w[on] significant peripheral changes in the segregated legal order.”36 I will
glean from these cases the legal philosophy and understanding Hastie and
Marshall had surrounding the Constitution and civil rights. These revelations into their Constitutional philosophy surrounding civil rights further
support their mission to establish an “equalitarian legal order” through advocating for individual rights.
Smith v. Allwright
Lonnie Smith was a Black dentist who lived in Houston, Texas. Mr.
Smith was denied the opportunity to vote in the Democratic party’s primary. Mr. Smith was denied the opportunity to vote because of a 1923 Texas
Statute that allowed political parties to establish their own internal rules
governing primary ballots and elections. The Harris County Democratic
party prohibited Black Americans from voting in their primary, requiring
voters to be white in order to participate. Disenfranchisement statutes such
as the 1923 Texas statute were prevalent throughout the American South in
the early part of the 20th century. Federal courts had largely deferred voting
rights challenges by Black Americans to the states. However, Smith
brought suit against S.S. Allwright, a Harris County election official, arguing that the Texas statute allowed the Democratic party to effectively utilize
state power to disenfranchise Black Americans from voting.

34. Floyd Delon supra at 279.
35. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S. Ct. 686, 692, 98
L. Ed. 873 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.
Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955).
36. Hastie, supra note 1, at 18.
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Hastie and Marshall argued on behalf of Smith in the United States Supreme Court. In their brief Hastie and Marshall wrote,
Petitioner asserts a right to participate in the choice of Senators and Representatives in Congress founded upon and guaranteed by Article I and the
17th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. He asserts further that his privilege of voting as guaranteed by the 15th Amendment of
the Constitution has been abridged. It follows from the decision of this
court in United States v. Classic, supra, that an elector’s constitutional
right to vote for and to participate in the choice of federal officers extends
to voting in primary elections which a state has made an integral part of its
machinery of choice, or which in fact are decisive of the choice.37

Hastie and Marshall asserted that the right to vote was fundamental regardless of race because of the language of the 15th Amendment and the precedent established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Classic.38 In
Classic, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that made it illegal for
state party officials to alter and misappropriate votes in party primaries. 39
The Court reasoned that the primary process was fundamental to elections.
Further, the Court asserted that voting in a primary election was one of the
few instances the people had an opportunity to choose a candidate without
ballot-access requirements.40 Hastie and Marshall crafted Smith’s disenfranchisement as a violation of the 15th Amendment’s guarantee of a citizen’s right to vote and the 17th Amendment’s provisions for the election of
representatives. Hastie and Marshall proffered an understanding of the provisions of the Constitution that extended protection to all people regardless
of race in the political primary process. They asserted in their brief,
“[w]hatever power local law or local political theory may confer upon a
political party with reference to the determination of its membership, that
power cannot be exercised in such manner as to infringe the constitutional
privilege of voting for federal officers.”41
Hastie and Marshall placed the Supreme Court in a conundrum. The
Court previously determined just a few years earlier in Classic that the primary process was an essential part of democratic elections. Additionally,
the Court held that Congress had the power under Article I, Section 4 to
indict state officials found to be violating a citizen’s voting rights in primary elections. Moreover, if the Court decided that the Texas statute and the
Harris County Democratic party’s practice of prohibiting a person from
voting in the primary based on their race, then the Court’s decision in Clas37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Smith v. Allwright, 1944 WL 42272, *6 (U.S., 2006).
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1042 (1941).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sic would be in jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court’s decision could potentially signal to states that they could circumvent Classic by imposing other
bans and requirements for the primary process; thus, virtually nullifying the
protections of the 15th and 17th Amendments. The Court understood the
Constitutional conundrum placed before them by Hastie and Marshall’s
advocacy and determined that the Texas statute was unconstitutional because it violated the 15th Amendment’s voting rights protections. The
Court stated in its opinion:
It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary
for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like
the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution. By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment that right may not be
abridged by any state on account of race. Under our Constitution the great
privilege of the ballot may not be denied a man by the State because of
his color. 42

The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, was a major win for Black Americans. The Court declared that the 15th Amendment protected Black Americans from being excluded from primary elections based on race. Moreover,
Smith reveals the unwavering commitment Hastie and Marshall had to extending the protections of the Constitution and her amendments to all people, as well as and the federal courts’ role in protecting those rights from
state infringement. Hastie and Marshall were laying the legal framework for
the establishment of an “equalitarian legal order.” Hastie, in examining
early civil rights cases such as Smith, wrote “high priority in the. . . national
campaign to make the legal order equalitarian had to be accorded to persuading the Court to reverse its sanction of the white primary. For without
political power, the black community had no effective means of selfhelp.”43 Smith was not the only case that Hastie and Thurgood’s dynamic
teamwork was demonstrated; one of the other cases was Morgan v. Virginia.
Morgan v. Virginia
Irene Morgan, a Black assembly line worker, was returning to Baltimore
from traveling to visit her mother in Virginia, via a Greyhound bus, when
she was asked to move from the “white” section to the “colored” section. A
Virginia statute required commercial-passenger travel buses to have separate colored and white sections for interstate and intrastate travelers. Moreover, conductors were required to extend or modify the allotment of colored

42. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 661–62, 64 S. Ct. at 764 (citation omitted).
43. Hastie, supra note 1, at 23.
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and white seats depending on the need. Any violation of the Virginia statute
was a misdemeanor offense.44 Morgan refused to move to a Black seat on
the bus, when asked by the conductor, in order for white passengers to sit in
her seat. As a result of her refusal, Morgan was arrested for violating the
statute. Throughout the country many of these segregation laws were
passed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, which
upheld the apartheid system of division between the races. Black men and
women were regulated to second class citizenry and this wall of separation
became the de jure law of the country.45 To many observers, the segregated
system was a reality of their time and any challenge to that seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, Hastie and Marshall challenged this Plessy system and
through an ingenious argument and prevailed in the Supreme Court.
Hastie and Marshall argued Ms. Morgan’s case from an innovative point
of view. Instead of challenging the Virginia law under the 14th amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, they challenged the constitutionality of the
statute under Congress’ interstate commerce power.46 Hastie and Marshall
argued that Virginia’s statute placed an “undue burden on interstate commerce.”47 In addition, Hastie and Marshall argued that the statute unduly
burdened interstate commerce because of the provision that allowed conductors to ask a passenger to move to a different seat at any point during
travel. Moreover, the effect of the Virginia statute extended its regulatory
reach into jurisdictions such as the District of Columbia where “the appellant would have had [the] freedom to occupy any available seat and so to
the end of her journey.”48 Hastie and Marshall’s interstate commerce challenge was an innovative use of the power that Congress has to regulate.
Furthermore, it gave federal courts the authority to strike down state statutes that encumbered Congress’ interstate commerce power for the reason
of race. Notably, the Supreme Court agreed with Hastie and Marshall’s
argument and reversed Ms. Morgan’s conviction. The Court’s reasoning
behind its decision is articulated in the opinion below:
[N]o state law can reach beyond its own border nor bar transportation of
passengers across its boundaries, diverse seating requirements for the races in interstate journeys result. As there is no federal act dealing with the
separation of races in interstate transportation, we must decide the validity

44. The sections are derived from an act of General Assembly of Virginia of 1930. Acts of Assembly, Va. 1930, p. 343.
45. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138; 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
46. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (Congress has the authority to “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”)
47. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 380, 66 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (1946).
48. Id. at 381, 66 S. Ct. at 1056.
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of this Virginia statute on the challenge that it interferes with commerce. .
.49

The Morgan decision is significant because the Court ruled that segregated
public travel was a violation of the Constitution. Hastie and Marshall’s advocacy was triumphant once again over the apartheid system in the United
States. States could no longer deny Black Americans the right to vote in
primary elections. Additionally, state laws that interfered with Congress’
ability to regulate interstate commerce on the basis of race would be struck
down by federal courts. Although winning this case was monumental, Hastie and Marshall’s work toward an “equalitarian legal order” was far from
over and their destinies would take them from the advocate’s podium to the
judge’s bench.
III.
PATHWAYS TO THE BENCH
Everywhere I looked for success, in almost every book I read, in almost
every description of the giants in the legal profession, in every picture of
the Supreme Court I saw, there was always one common quality, an absence of Black faces. . . .It is in the context of this background that
Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and especially William
Hastie, were so important to me, to every black student in my class at
Yale, and I truly believe every black law student in America. 50

The preceding quote highlights the importance of Hastie and Marshall’s
legacy to a generation of Black intellectuals. “Could a Black man serve as a
federal judge?” Hastie was the first Black man to be appointed to the federal bench in 1937, by President Roosevelt, when he was appointed to the
District Court of the Virgin Islands. 51 Moreover, in 1949 President Truman
appointed Hastie to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.52 Furthermore,
Marshall was appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the United
States Supreme Court in 1967. This section will reflect on the pathways
Hastie and Marshall took to the federal appellate bench.

49. Id. at 386, 66 S. Ct. at 1058.
50. A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., Judge William Hastie- One Who Changed the Immutable,
24 How. L.J. 259, 263 (1981).
51. Ware, supra note 4, at 86.
52. Higginbotham Jr., supra note 50, at 263 (“I shall never forget October 21, 1949, when by the
stroke of his pen, the thirty-third President of the United States, Harry Truman, answered my Philadelphia barber and reversed the trend of centuries of exclusion by nominating William Henry Hastie for
appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.”).
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Judge William Hastie’s historic appointment to the Third Circuit.
Hastie worked under the Truman administration as Governor of the Virgin Islands and also campaigned for Truman in the 1948 election.53 Despite
the collegiate relationship between Truman and Hastie, Hastie’s nomination
to the Third Circuit was not set in stone. Hastie, in discussing his 1949
nomination to the Third Circuit, stated “[m]y nomination. . . almost did not
come out for eight months. It was very doubtful whether it would ever
come out of the Senate committee.”54 Congressional obstructionism toward
Presidential actions, specifically in regards to judicial nominations, was
common during the time. Opposition to the first “negro” man to hold a lifetenured judicial post was prevalent and intense. Constitutional law professor, April Dawson, examines the congressional obstructionism at play in
Hastie’s judicial nomination: Hastie was nominated by Truman on October
15, 1949, and after no Senate action or any indication that the Senate would
act, Hastie received a recess appointment from Truman on October 21,
1949.55 Hastie was re-nominated to the Third Circuit on January 5, 1950,
but was not finally confirmed by the Senate until July 19, 1950.56 Hastie’s
nomination was delayed for more than six-months which was unprecedented for the time.57 Despite the obstruction by the Senate, no one could deny
the symbolic importance of Hastie’s appointment to Black Americans. Hastie would go on to serve twenty-six years and place his mark on the jurisprudence of the country. Furthermore, Hastie was the first Black American
considered for the United States Supreme Court.58 Hastie’s consideration
for the Supreme Court was an important footnote in President Kennedy’s
short presidency. A Black man would be appointed to the Court, but it
wouldn’t be Hastie. Moreover, Kennedy, unfortunately would not be able to
appoint Hastie due to his assassination in 1963.
Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation to the Supreme Court
For many in 2020, the appointment of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme
Court is reflected upon as a time of racial progress and liberal momentum.
However, the reality at the time of Marshall’s appointment was that of divi53. Transcript of Oral History Interview with William H. Hastie, Judge, in Philadelphia, Pa. at 68
(Jan. 5, 1972).
54. Id. at 80.
55. April G. Dawson, Laying the Foundation: How President Obama’s Judicial Nominations
Have Paved The Way For A More Diverse Supreme Court, 60 Howard L.J. 685, 690-91 (2017).
56. Id. at 691.
57. Id.
58. Just One More Vote for Frankfurter: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judge William Hastie,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1639, 1640 (2004). (“When the time comes Judge William Hastie of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals should get [the] most serious consideration for appointment to the Supreme Court.”).
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sion, partisanship, and disruption.59 Racial tensions were high, police brutality was rampant and a general feeling of distrust for the government was
common among the oppressed in society.60 Despite the heated climate,
Marshall’s Supreme Court appointment confirmation provided some
hope.61 During Marshall’s confirmation many Senators, including southern
senators, aired their respect for Marshall and the legacy he had acquired
thus far.62 Marshall was confirmed by the US Senate in a vote of 69-11 on
August 30, 1967.63 Marshall’s appointment to the Highest Court served as a
pinnacle point for the man who had effectively crafted and created the law
applied by the Warren Court in its administration of civil rights law.64 It
was long overdue for Marshall to serve on the Court that he argued before
so many times. The mandate was clear; Marshall had to continue the work
he started, but this time from the judge’s bench. Justice was finally in
Black.
IV.
JUSTICE IN BLACK
Judge Hastie and Justice Marshall were committed to establishing an
equalitarian legal order and their commitment was evident through their
First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Hastie and Marshall were both
early advocates for civil rights and agreed that the Constitution and her
amendments should protect all Americans especially Black Americans.65
Further, they both agreed that the federal courts were one of the few places
individuals could seek remedy if their rights were violated by the government. This discussion focuses on jurists Hastie and Marshall’s First
Amendment jurisprudence in regard to free speech and the Fourth amendment’s protection against governmental searches and seizures. Hastie and
Marshall’s jurisprudence in free speech, and searches and seizures affirms
their commitment to establishing an equalitarian legal order through the
Constitution.
The First Amendment
Hastie’s commitment to establishing an equalitarian legal order guaranteed by the First Amendment is evidenced in U.S. v. Mesarosh. In
59. Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Supreme Court,
6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 27 (1989).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Dawson, supra note 55, at 691.
64. Greene, supra note 59, at 28.
65. Id. at 34.
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Mesarosh, Hastie opined that the First Amendment protects all speech including speech considered unpopular and dangerous. Mesarosh was a
member of the communist party and was accused, along with a group of
other men, of violating the Smith Act.66 The Smith Act made it a crime for
a person to teach, advocate or distribute information concerning overthrowing of the U.S. government.67 Mesarosh was convicted under the Smith Act
even though the prosecution did not have any direct evidence that (1)
Mesarosh had the means “to accomplish the overthrow of the government
of the United States by force and violence as speedily as circumstances
would permit; or (2) that Mesarosh acted with the intent to conspire to overthrow the government.”68 The majority opinion in the Third Circuit found
that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to support Mesorash’s convictions and that the evidence of Mesarosh’s conspiracy could be proven from
the surrounding evidence and circumstances.69 Hastie dissented from the
majority and argued that the prosecution failed to prove that Mesarosh and
his fellow defendants had the requisite intent to advocate overthrowing the
government, nor did they have the ability to do so. Hastie penned in his
dissent:
It has already been pointed out but will bear restatement, that this distinction is of basic importance in all constitutional theory of restrictions on utterance permissible under the First Amendment. The line which the courts
try to draw distinguishes punishable incitation to insurrectionary action
from permissible teaching that at some time in the future violence is inevitable and the ‘proletariat’ must be ready for it. If their present tactic is a
waiting game, characterized by the teaching of revolutionary theory while
incitation to action is left for the indefinite future, the First Amendment
prevents the government from proscribing their teaching.70

Moreover, Hastie argued that the First Amendment required more than
just intent and words to incite violent action, but that violent action should
be readily apparent and achievable when the words are spoken in order for
a person’s speech to be censored by the government. Hastie adopted Justice
Holmes’s approach to speech, wherein speech that is deemed dangerous or
inciteful requires that there be a showing of clear and present danger in
order for the speaker’s speech to be deemed punishable by the government.71 Hastie’s judicial philosophy placed the burden on the government to
66. United States v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d 449, 466 (3d Cir. 1955), rev’d 352 U.S. 1, 77 S. C.t 1, 1
L. Ed. 2d 1 (1956).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 459.
70. Id. at 463-64 (Hastie, J. dissenting).
71. Just One More Vote for Frankfurter: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judge William Hastie,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1639 (2004).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol43/iss1/3

12

Courts: Justice in Black: William Hastie and Thurgood Marshall's Fight fo

2020]

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

89

prove that its actions in censoring and punishing even the most hated form
of speech comported with the First Amendment’s protection of speech. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the majority’s decision on the basis that
the government’s evidence did not support Mesarosh’s conviction that he or
his associates were advocating and conspiring a violent overthrow of the
government. 72
Furthermore, Marshall’s view concerning the protections of the First
Amendment is articulated in Stanley v. Georgia; one of his first majority
opinions on the Supreme Court. In Stanley, Robert Eli Stanley, the defendant, was previously charged with illegal bookkeeping activities which resulted in federal officers obtaining a warrant to search Stanley’s home for
betting paraphernalia.73 The officers found little evidence in Stanley’s home
concerning illegal bookmaking activity; however, officers discovered a
ream of film that contained obscene material in a desk drawer in Stanley’s
bedroom. Stanley was convicted of violating a Georgia statute which made
it illegal to possess obscene material. Stanley appealed his conviction arguing that the Georgia obscenity statute violated the First Amendment by punishing possession of obscene material.74 Marshall and the Supreme Court
ruled that the Georgia obscenity statute violated the First Amendment because “mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be
made a crime.”75
Marshall reasoned in his opinion that the Constitution, through the First
Amendment, protected the right of an individual to receive “information
and ideas.”76 Moreover, Marshall opined that the First Amendment’s protections cover an individual’s right to “satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home [and] the contents of his library.”77
Marshall explained that the First Amendment protects an individual and
“that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving the government the power to
control men’s minds.”78 Marshall’s commitment to individual rights and his
expansive view of the First Amendment is evident in his decision in Stanley. Additionally, Marshall determined that the First Amendment protected

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1956).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969).
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
Id.
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private possession of obscene material, where there was no evidence of the
intent to distribute.79
Both Hastie and Marshall shared a commitment to the belief that the First
Amendment’s right to freedom of speech protected individuals in addition
to speech that is controversial and unpopular. Hastie and Marshall’s First
Amendment jurisprudence reflects their desire to establish an equalitarian
legal order that protects individuals, especially those in marginalized communities, from overly restrictive government censors on speech and selfexpression.
The Fourth Amendment
Moreover, Hastie and Marshall’s belief in an equalitarian legal order influenced their decisions in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases. In
Florida v. Bostick, in response to alleged rampant drug trafficking in the
state of Florida, the Sheriff’s Department in Broward County instituted a
drug problem that allowed officers to board public transportation and search
persons they suspected were engaged in drug activity.80 Bostick was on a
bus heading from Miami to Atlanta when two officers entered the bus and
asked Bostick if they could search his luggage for drugs.81 Bostick consented to the search and the officers found cocaine in Bostick’s luggage.82 The
officers did not reveal to Bostick that he had the option to reject their
search.83 The majority reasoned that the officers’ practice was constitutional
because the officers boarding a passenger bus and asking individuals to
search their luggage was not in itself coercive.84 Moreover, the majority
reasoned that the officer’s request did not create a situation where a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate their encounter with the officer
and refuse the officer’s request.85 Marshall rejected the view of the majority
and wrote a vigorous dissent that reflects his view on the protections of the
Fourth Amendment in response to police conduct.
Marshall begins his dissent with a fiery exclamation against the political
atmosphere of the time surrounding increased police officer brutality in
alleged drug activity. Marshall wrote:
Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a “war on drugs.” No one disputes
that it is the job of law-enforcement officials to devise effective weapons

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 567-68.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 437.
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for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique
is not proof of its constitutionality. 86

Marshall continues his dissent arguing that one of the primary aims of the
Fourth Amendment was to protect citizens from being searched by the government without particularized suspicion.87 Marshall’s dissent asserts his
view that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution limits the authority of
police officers in regards to coercive searches of a person without either
their consent or a valid warrant. Furthermore, Marshall’s dissent critiqued
the methods used by police officers in conducting searches of individuals
on commercial passenger vehicles without a “clear articulable suspicion.”88
In addition, Marshall condemned the searches “as inconvenient, intrusive,
and intimidating.”89 Marshall admonishes the Court to review the facts of
the case and come to a conclusion that an officers entrance onto a public
transportation vehicle, while in uniform, and singling out an individual or
individuals to search is coercive and is a seizure for the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.90 Moreover, Marshall argued that the majority’s affirmation of the police search in Bostick would allow police officers to search
individuals without having the requite reasonable suspicion.91 Marshall
concludes his dissent by writing:
The majority attempts to gloss over the violence that today’s decision does
to the Fourth Amendment with empty admonitions. “If th[e] [war on
drugs] is to be fought,” the majority intones, “those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime.” The majority’s actions, however,
speak louder than its words.92

Marshall’s dissent sheds light on his view on the importance of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections for individuals in response to coercive actions
taken by law enforcement. Marshall believed that the court’s job was to
ensure that police conduct comported with Fourth Amendment protections
regardless of the law enforcement’s success in deterring crime.93 Marshall’s
commitment to the establishment of an equalitarian legal order ensured that
individuals were protected from excessive governmental searches and seizures that were outside of the Fourth Amendment’s requirements.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 450.
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Moreover, Hastie adopted a similar view on the limits of police authority
in regard to the provisions of the Fourth Amendment in Hanna v. United
States.94 In Hanna, the defendant was convicted of housebreaking and robbery. The defendant requested that the district court suppress the evidence
obtained by police because the search of the defendant’s motel room was
warrantless.95 Hastie’s opinion outlined the precedent set out by the Supreme Court in determining the admissibility of evidence obtained without
a warrant by state vs. federal officials.96 Hastie reasoned:
[W]e think all evidence obtained [in] violation of the Constitution should
be excluded. [A] decision ‘whether to exclude illegally obtained evidence
in federal trials is left largely to our discretion, for admissibility of evidence is governed ‘by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.’97

Additionally, Hastie believed that the Fourth Amendment prohibits state
and federal government officials from obtaining evidence through illegal
means and having it admitted at trial.98 Hastie’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment required that judicial restraints be placed upon government
officials (i.e. exclusion of evidence at trial) in order to ensure that they
comply with the requirements of the Constitution in regards to searches and
seizures.99 Hastie sharply rebuked what he regarded as the “tendency of
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts.”100 Hastie reprimands federal courts for “play[ing] the ‘ignoble part’
by themselves permitting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.”101 It is clear that Hastie believed the failure of federal courts in allowing illegal evidence obtained through unlawful means to be admitted at
trial was a violation of their constitutional duty and mandate to enforce and
protect the freedoms of the Fourth Amendment.
Hastie’s and Marshall’s jurisprudence in the areas of the First and Fourth
Amendments demonstrated their commitment to protecting individuals’
rights from government violation and intrusion. Hastie’s and Marshall’s
legal philosophies embody the importance of human dignity and equality
under the law. Of Hastie’s jurisprudence, it can be said, “throughout his
94. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
95. Id. at 723-24.
96. Id. at 725-27.
97. Id. at 728.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914)), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
101. Id.
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judicial career Hastie was determined that his opinions should reflect not
only a principled method of inquiry but a systemic one as well.”102 Hastie
was a pragmatic progressive, believing in the importance of “stare decisis”
while honoring the role federal court’s played in protecting individual rights
from state overreach.103 Concerning Marshall’s judicial philosophy it can be
stated that Marshall believed wholeheartedly in the power of the Constitution and the judge’s ability to adapt, modify and shape the document to fit
within the interests of justice and equality for all people.104 Marshall believed in the idea that lawyers and judges were social engineers, who utilized the law and the Constitution to shape working solutions for society’s
problems.105 Hastie and Marshall’s judicial vision of an equalitarian legal
order were important to the development of 20th-century jurisprudence
surrounding the application of the First and Fourth Amendments and the
protection of individual rights from governmental intrusion.
CONCLUSION
By 1950, the Black community, a substantial part of the white community,
and the government of the United States had join[ed] in support of . . . an
equalitarian legal order, that had been set twenty years earlier.106

William Hastie and Thurgood Marshall helped usher in an era of civil rights
litigation that challenged the prevailing norms of the twentieth century and
embodied the innovative spirit of the age. Hastie and Marshall’s advocacy
in Smith v. Allwright and Morgan v. Virginia challenged the segregationist
legal order of the United States and laid the foundation for a more equitable
legal system. Moreover, Hastie and Marshall broke the stained-glass ceiling
for Black Americans by being the first two Black men appointed to federal
appellate courts, Hastie to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and Marshall
to the United States Supreme Court. These men dedicated their life and
careers to the administration of justice and the evolution of the rule of law.
Furthermore, Hastie and Marshall were colleagues that established themselves as distinct men and distinguished jurists while embodying “Justice in
Black;” the establishment of an equalitarian legal order.

102. Jonathan J. Rusch, William H. Hastie and the Vindication of Civil Rights, 21 HOW. L.J. 749,
806 (1978).
103. Id. at 809.
104. Lynn Adelman, The Glorious Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV.
113 (2013).
105. Mark V. Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 1996 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1129,
1141 (1996).
106. Hastie, supra note 1, at 30.
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